1043期 12月3日 :Incentivizing Organ Donation Under Constraints: Theory and Experiment(李梦玲,副教授,厦门大学)

时间:2019-11-27

【主题】 Incentivizing Organ Donation Under Constraints: Theory and Experiment
【报告人】李梦玲(副教授,厦门大学)
【时间】12月3日 星期二 15:30-17:00
【地点】 经济学院楼701室
【摘要】 The ever-increasing shortage of organs for transplantation has motivated many innovative policies to promote organ supply. A well-designed organ allocation policy helps to moderate organ scarcity by improving allocation efficiency and providing stronger donation incentives. This paper studies the efficacy of the donor-priority rule in promoting deceased organ donation under blood-type compatibility constraints in both theory and the laboratory. Compared with a scenario in which transplantations are operated only within the same blood-type cohort, we find that allowing cross-blood-type transplantations discourages the donation incentives of hard-to-match agents (e.g., O type), while easy-to-match agents (e.g., AB type) have higher incentives to donate. More importantly, we show that under mild conditions, the aggregate donation rate is lower with cross-blood-type transplantations.

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