近期，上财经院经济学系的Sambuddha Ghosh副教授与Yan Long , Manipushpak Mitra的合作论文“Prior-free online Mechanisms for Queueing with Arrivals”在理论经济学一流期刊、我校认定的经济学国际二类期刊Economic Theory上正式发表。
论文摘要
Agents from a finite population arrive at various discrete times, and exit after they use a server for one period each. Each agent has a per-period cost of queueing, which constitutes his private information. Among direct mechanisms that are prior-free, i.e. independent of distributions of arrivals and costs, and online, i.e. charge only those present in the system, we characterize the class of dynamically strategy-proof mechanisms with least total waiting cost. The budget is balanced eventually under a mild condition on the arrival sequence, while a canonical mechanism that achieves budget balance in each period is also characterized under a stronger condition.
Sambuddha Ghosh副教授为我院2015年引进的“常任轨”（Tenure-track）教师，博士毕业于美国普林斯顿大学，主要研究领域为微观经济理论，博弈论，曾获2018年国家自然科学基金国际（地区）合作外国青年学者研究基金项目支持。
上海财经大学经济学院一直将科研创新能力视为学科核心竞争力的重要组成部分，学院教师科研团队以一流学科建设标准严格要求，积极探索、勇于创新，充分发挥学院持续推进的教育改革成果效益，坚定探索立足中国国情的国际化课题研究思路，持续推动前沿领域的问题研究，为学院的学科研究发展添砖加瓦。
（供稿、图：宋玥 编审：孙燕）