【主题】Collecting Consumer Data under Adverse Selection
【报告人】陈斌（教授，华中科技大学）
【时间】2024年5月14日周二13:30-14:45
【地点】经济学院401会议室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper aims to study the intersection of two classic topics in economics: price discrimination and adverse selection. The conventional wisdom in the literature is that, compared with uniform pricing, first-degree price discrimination allows the monopoly to better extract the surplus from trade. However, we find an opposite result in a market where consumers are uninformed of the seller's product quality. In order to signal high quality, the monopoly can charge a high price that leads to a low volume of sales --- a result that is more costly to the low-quality seller (who has a low marginal cost of production). The signaling cost borne by the high-quality seller depends on, among other things, the demand curve it faces. In particular, we find that the aggregate signaling cost can go up if the monopoly possesses more precise information about the consumers' willingness to pay.
【报告人简介】陈斌, 华中科技大学教授，经济系主任。2010年在香港大学经济与金融学院取得博士学位，2015年在中山大学取得长聘教职，2021年调入华中科技大学。长期从事信息经济学、产业经济学等研究，十余篇英文论文发表在Economic Journal、Journal of Economic Theory、Management Science、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、International Journal of Industrial Organization等国际期刊，以及《经济研究》，主持国家自然科学基金课题3项，教育部人文社科规划课题1项等。