经鸿之粟 | 我院韩翔常任副教授论文在经济学国际一类期刊发表

In the allocation of indivisible objects under weak priorities, a common practice is to break the ties using a lottery and randomize over deterministic mechanisms. Such randomizations usually lead to unfairness and inefficiency ex-ante. We propose and study the concept of ex-ante fairness for random allocations, extending some key results in the one-sided and two-sided matching markets. It is shown that the set of ex-ante fair random allocations forms a complete and distributive lattice under first-order stochastic dominance relations, and the agent-optimal ex-ante fair mechanism includes both the deferred acceptance algorithm and the probabilistic serial mechanism as special cases. Instead of randomizing over deterministic mechanisms, our mechanism is constructed using the division method, a new general way of constructing random mechanisms from deterministic mechanisms. As additional applications, we demonstrate that several previous extensions of the probabilistic serial mechanism have their foundations in existing deterministic mechanisms.

韩翔，上海财经大学经济学院常任副教授、博士生导师。主要研究领域为匹配理论和市场设计。近年来在Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics 等期刊发表论文；主持国家自然科学基金青年项目。