经鸿之粟 | 我院虎高计常任副教授合作论文在经济学国际一类期刊在线发表

近日，我院微观经济学系虎高计常任副教授与湖南大学杨湘黔副教授、新加坡国立大学Yi-Chun Chen教授合作撰写的论文“Information design in allocation with costly verification”在经济学国际一类期刊International Economic Review正式在线发表。

We study information design in a single-agent allocation problem with costly verification, where the principal has a positive reservation value. The agent learns privately a signal about the principal's allocation value, drawn from a distribution controlled by an information designer. Given the signal distribution, the principal designs a mechanism to maximize her net value. We show that the agent-optimal information pools high values at a signal just worth verification, whereas the principal-optimal information features full disclosure. Moreover, any agent-optimal information is principal-worst, despite their partially aligned interests and the absence of transfers.

虎高计，上海财经大学经济学院常任副教授，新加坡国立大学经济学博士；兼任 Journal of Mathematical Economics 副主编。研究领域为匹配理论、机制设计、显示偏好理论等。研究成果发表于Theoretical Economics、American Economic Journal: Microeconomics、International Economic Review、Games and Economic Behavior (2篇) 、Social Choice and Welfare 等学术期刊。科研项目包括国家自然科学基金青年项目、面上项目、重大项目(参与），以及上海市浦江人才计划。