新学期伊始，上财经院论文发表情况喜讯频传，经济学系Sambuddha Ghosh副教授的合作论文“Intimidation: Linking Negotiation and Conflict”、贺思民副教授的合作论文“The Power and Limits of Sequential Communication in Coordination Game” 以及张燕副教授的合作论文“The good, the bad and the ugly: Chinese imports, European Union anti-dumping measures and firm performance”先后分别被经济学分支领域顶尖期刊、我校经济学国际一类期刊International Economic Review、Journal of Economic Theory、Journal of International Economics 接受发表，开启学院2019年高水平国际论文发表的开门红。
Sambuddha Ghosh副教授，美国普林斯顿大学博士，研究领域为经济理论、博弈论、政治经济学。2015年受聘为我院“常任轨”（Tenure-track）副教授，此前曾任教于波士顿大学，在微观经济学国际顶尖期刊AEJ：Microeconomics等发表论文。
贺思民副教授，荷兰阿姆斯特丹大学博士，研究领域为行为经济学、实验经济学、博弈论。自2016年受聘为我院“常任轨”（Tenure-track）助教授以来，科研成绩突出，已在经济学分支领域国际顶尖期刊Management Science、Games and Economic Behavior发表2篇论文，展现出较强科研势头，目前是我院行为与实验经济学团队主力成员。
张燕副教授，香港大学经济学博士，研究领域为国际经济学、中国经济。2013年入职学院以来，已有2篇合作论文分别发表在我校经济学国际一类期刊Journal of International Economics ，且有一篇发表在我校经济学国际二类期刊Journal of Comparative Economics上。
附论文摘要：
Intimidation: Linking Negotiation and Conflict
Sambuddha Ghosh, Gabriele Gratton, Caixia Shen
Abstract: A challenger wants a resource initially held by a defender, who can negotiate a settlement by offering to share the resource. If challenger rejects, conflict ensues. During conflict each player could be a tough type for whom fighting is costless. Therefore non-concession intimidates the opponent into conceding. Unlike in models where negotiations happen in the shadow of exogenously specified conflicts, the rejected offer determines how conflict is played if negotiations fail. In turn, how players are expected to play during conflict determines their negotiating positions. In equilibrium, negotiations always fail with positive probability, even if players face a high cost of conflict. Allowing multiple offers leads to brinkmanship—the only acceptable offer is the one made when conflict is imminent. If negotiations fail, conflict is prolonged and non-duration dependent.
The Power and Limits of Sequential Communication in Coordination Game
SiminHe,Theo Offerman,Jeroenvan de Ven
Abstract: We study theoretically and experimentally the extent to which communication can solve coordination problems when there is some conflict of interest. We investigate various communication protocols, including one in which players chat sequentially and free-format. We develop a model based on the ‘feigned-ignorance principle’, according to which players ignore any communication unless they reach an agreement in which both players are (weakly) better off. With standard preferences, the model predicts that communication is effective in Battle-of-the-Sexes but futile in Chicken. A remarkable implication is that increasing players' payoffs can make them worse off, by making communication futile. Our experimental findings provide strong support for these and some other predictions.
The good, the bad and the ugly: Chinese imports, European Union anti-dumping measures and firm performance
LizaJabbour,ZhigangTao,EnricoVanino,YanZhang
Abstract：This paper analyses the effects of the European Union's anti-dumping tariffs against Chinese imports on all affected firms: “the good” European import-competing firms, “the bad” Chinese exporters and “the ugly” European importers of dumped products. The results show that temporary import tariffs are beneficial to the least productive “good” EU producers, but harms the most productive “ugly” EU importers. Overall, the net effects of anti-dumping policy on European employment and exports are largely negative. Also tariffs enhance the productivity of surviving “bad” Chinese exporters and widens the productivity gap with European competitors.