In China, state owners make minority equity investments in private firms. We study the allocative implications of such government investments using a two-sector DSGE model with financial friction and idiosyncratic productivities. In our model, private owners are more productive than state owners but face tighter financial constraints. Equity investment by a state owner alleviates the private owner’s financial constraint but dampens its own productivity, consistent with Chinese firm-level data. Under this setup, only private owners with sufficiently high productivity accept such investment, while only state owners with sufficiently low productivity make such investment. As a result, expansion of such government investment improves capital allocation within each sector and across sectors. Our analysis shows that financial liberalizations, including liberalizing interest-rate controls and reducing the loan-to-value gap between sectors, stimulate private owners’ demand for such government investment but discourage state owners from making it, thus generating an ambiguous effect on aggregate productivity.

张婧屹,上海财经大学经济学院宏观经济学系常任副教授。在Journal of Monetary Economics、Journal of International Economics、Journal of Development Economics、Review of Economic Dynamics等国际一流期刊发表多篇论文;曾主持国家自然科学青年基金、面上基金、香港货币及金融研究中心主题研究项目。

连莉莉,上海财经大学经济学院2019级西方经济学专业博士生,博士导师为张婧屹副教授,现北京大学汇丰商学院博士后,主要研究领域为宏观经济、货币政策与金融摩擦。研究论文发表在Journal of Development Economics、《金融研究》等期刊。
供稿、供图 | 张婧屹
编辑 | 杜雨晴
审核 | 燕红忠








