经鸿之粟 | 唐前锋常任教授合作论文在经济学国际一类期刊正式发表

上海财经大学经济学院微观经济学系唐前锋常任教授合作论文On the Core of Markets with Co-ownerships and Indivisibilities在经济学国际一类期刊Journal of Economic Theory在线发表。

论文摘要

Following Balbuzanov and Kotowski (2019), we study the exchange of indivisible objects among agents with unit demand, where initially each object is either privately owned or is co-owned by multiple agents. We propose a new notion of core called the effective core for these problems to address the inadequacies of conventional notions of core. We say that a coalition effectively blocks an assignment if it weakly blocks it—as in the definition of the strong core—and the blocking is credible in the sense that no agent in the coalition takes any redundant object owned by a self-feasible subcoalition. We show that the effective core is a nonempty subset of the weak core and a superset of the strong core, and all assignments in it are Pareto efficient. We also propose a strategy-proof algorithm to find assignments in the effective core. Lastly, we make a detailed comparison between the effective core and Balbuzanov and Kotowski’s exclusion core.、

唐前锋，上海财经大学经济学院常任教授，主要从事微观经济理论、博弈论和市场机制设计等领域的研究。研究成果发表于 Journal of Economic Theory、 Games and Economic Behavior 等期刊。