【主题】Perceived Competition
【报告人】龙妍（副教授，华中科技大学）
【时间】2023年5月23日周二下午14:00-15:30
【地点】经济学院401会议室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We consider economic situations in which agents have imperfect knowledge about the set of agents they are in competition with. Imperfect knowledge is captured through a directed graph that we call a perception network. We introduce an equilibrium concept, Perception-Consistent Equilibrium (PCE), a self-confirming equilibrium in which agents only perceive local competitors. We show that, at each PCE, agents' action levels are proportional to their eigenvector centrality in the perception network. Inactivity in parts of the perception network remains salient, even at the unique stable PCE. Our model can explain why some individuals living in closed communities (such as criminal gangs) make decisions only based on their local environment while others are more aware of the global competition they are facing.
【报告人简介】Long Yan is an Associate Professor in the Economics Department at Huazhong University of Science and Technology. Her main research areas are game theory, market design, fair division, and electricity market. She has published several papers in well-known journals such as Journal of Economic Theory, Games and Economic Behavior, Economic Theory, and Social Choice and Welfare.
