经鸿之粟 | 经济学院2026年三季度高质量论文概览

发布者:杜雨晴发布时间:2026-10-14浏览次数:10




2026年第三季度,上海财经大学经济学院师生学术研究成果丰硕,在国内外知名经济学期刊发表论文17篇。其中,经济学国际二类期刊及以上发文9篇;国内权威期刊发文2篇。以下主要学术成果主要情况与摘要。





微观经济学系朱曙光常任副教授合作论文Optimal Design of Market Access在经济学国际一类期刊American Economic Journal-Microeconomics正式发表。


Optimal Design of Market Access

American Economic Journal-Microeconomics

Volume18,  August 2026


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We study a data provider’s problem of optimally designing and selling marketing  lists that enable a retailer with private types to access consumers with heterogeneous characteristics. When virtual values satisfy a particular form of convexity (named boundary  dominance), under certain regularity conditions, the optimal mechanism comprises fully revealing marketing lists, irrespective of whether the retailer’s types are vertically or horizontally ordered. Moreover, in the vertical case, the optimal mechanism allows a simple “ fixed-price” implementation. In the horizontal case, it exhibits no-exclusion and rotation properties. Conversely, if boundary dominance is violated, the optimal mechanism may not be fully revealing.





资源与环境经济学系张瑜讲师合作论文Securing power, compromising climate: Evidence from drought shocks in China在经济学国际一类期刊Journal of Development Economics正式发表。


Securing power, compromising climate: Evidence from drought shocks in China

Journal of Development Economics

Volume183,  September 2026


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This paper examines how natural disasters complicate government efforts to balance energy security with the energy transition in regulated electricity systems. Using random variations in runoff as a natural experiment, we find that droughts lead to a long-term expansion of coal-fired power capacity. This expansion is reflected in extensive-margin adjustments, particularly through the commissioning of new coal-fired power plants. We also show that, under administrative regulation of electricity trading and generation, this investment response is driven primarily by government efforts to strengthen power supply stability rather than by firms’ profit-seeking incentives alone. Our findings highlight how adaptive responses to climate-related supply shocks can generate long-lasting fossil-fuel legacies in developing countries where electricity markets are not yet fully developed.





宏观经济学系宁磊教授合作论文The impact of pension reforms and rapid aging on savings and labor supply在经济学国际一类期刊Journal of Public Economics正式发表。


The impact of pension reforms and rapid aging on savings and labor supply

Journal of Public Economics

Volume261,  July 2026


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Over the past three decades, China has experienced substantial reductions in social security benefits due to pension reforms and undergone profound demographic changes. By combining empirical studies and quantitative analyses in a general equilibrium setting, this paper examines the effects of China’s pension reforms and rapid population aging on household saving and labor supply behaviors. Calibrating the model to the Chinese economy, we find that the pension reforms alone account for approximately 25 percent of the increase in the household saving rate between 1995 and 2009, and 49 percent of the sharp rise in labor supply over the same period. These effects are significantly amplified by rapid aging. Our study demonstrates that both household saving and labor supply serve as quantitatively important self-insurance channels in response to changes in pension generosity and longevity risk.





微观经济学系贺思民常任教授、博士毕业生邹心璐合作论文Responsibility Sharing in a Public Bad Experiment在经济学国际二类期刊Economic Theory正式发表。


Responsibility Sharing in a Public Bad Experiment

Economic Theory

Volume2,  August 2026


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We propose a novel mechanism to mitigate the provision of public bads in large groups. In the baseline case with centralized punishment, players choose their neighbors and having more neighbors brings benefits. Each player then decides whether to provide a public bad, which yields personal benefits but imposes costs on the entire group. A small chance exists that a player providing the public bad will be detected and punished. In the responsibility-sharing mechanism, when a player is caught providing the public bad, their neighbors are also punished. Our theoretical analysis and experimental results strongly support the effectiveness of this mechanism in promoting Pareto optimal outcomes. In addition, using another experimental treatment, we determine that the mechanism is less effective in the absence of complete feedback information.





计量经济学系张杭辉常任副教授合作论文Semiparametric Estimation of Quantile Regression with Binary Quantile Selection在经济学国际二类期刊Econometric Theory正式发表。


Semiparametric Estimation of Quantile Regression with Binary Quantile Selection

Econometric Theory

Volume42,  August 2026


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This article proposes a novel method for estimating quantile regression models that account for sample selection. Unlike the approach by Arellano and Bonhomme(2017, Econometrica 85(1), 1–28; hereafter referred to as AB17), which employs a parametric selection equation, our method utilizes a standard binary quantile regression model to handle the selection issue, thereby accommodating general heterogeneity in both the selection and outcome equations. We adopt a semiparametric estimation technique for the outcome quantile regression by integrating local moment conditions, resulting in√n-consistent estimators for the quantile coefficients and copula parameter. Monte Carlo simulation results demonstrate that our estimator performs well in finite samples. Additionally, we apply our method to examine the wage distribution among women using a randomly simulated sample from the US General Social Survey. Our key finding is the presence of significant positive selection among women in the US, which is notably more pronounced than the estimates produced by the AB17’s model.





微观经济学系朱曙光常任副教授合作论文Bayesian Persuasion Followed by Receiver's Mechanism Design在经济学国际二类期刊Social Choice and Welfare正式发表。


Bayesian Persuasion Followed by Receiver's Mechanism Design

Social Choice and Welfare

Volume67,  August 2026


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In Bayesian persuasion, Receiver simply plays an action after Sender’s public signaling. However, in some applications, it seems natural that Receiver could elicit more information from Sender by offering a screening contract. We study its economic implications, mainly in a stylized binary, quasilinear environment. In the first model where Sender acquires full information as his private information, the public signal is less informative than that in Bayesian persuasion, suggesting that the public and private signals are “substitutes”. Meanwhile, both Sender and Receiver are better off than in Bayesian persuasion: Sender prefers “being further screened”. In the second model where Sender jointly designs both public and private signals, he sometimes finds it more profitable to have less precise private information. The outcome is most efficient (both in terms of information and welfare) with the first model, less so with the second model, and least in Bayesian persuasion. This suggests that economic pre-dictions based on the standard Bayesian persuasion model might be biased toward overly inefficient outcomes.





经济史学系李耀华副教授、博士研究生肖宇涵合作论文Price discovery and long-distance market integration: Evidence from the Republican Chinese Cotton Goods Exchange在经济学国际二类期刊Explorations in Economic History正式发表。


Price discovery and long-distance market integration: Evidence from the Republican Chinese Cotton Goods Exchange

Explorations in Economic History

Volume101, July 2026


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Market integration is vital for economic development; its determinants have been extensively documented in the literature. However, relatively little attention has been paid to the role of economic organizations. This paper seeks to fill this gap by investigating the role of futures exchanges in Republican China. Using manually collected primary data, we employ a continuous difference-in-differences approach to analyze the impact of the Chinese Cotton Goods Exchange on long-distance market integration. We find that, following the exchange's establishment in 1921, geographically distant cities experienced a stronger increase in market integration with Shanghai than nearby cities. Regarding the underlying mechanism, we show that the price-discovery function of the futures exchange promoted long-distance market integration by centralizing markets and reducing price uncertainty.





微观经济学系杜宁华常任教授、博士研究生杨毅合作论文Spillover Effects of Monitoring: An Experiment on Lying在经济学国际二类期刊Journal of Economics & Management Strategy正式发表。


Spillover Effects of Monitoring: An Experiment on Lying

Journal of Economics & Management Strategy

Volume3, August 2026


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We experimentally investigate the spillover effects of monitoring. In a controlled laboratory experiment, participants simultaneously self‐report their payoffs in two tasks. Holding lies in the untargeted task to never be penalized, we vary the observability and the punishment for lying in the targeted task as follows: (1) the experimenter cannot observe the random draw that determines the payoff the participant should report, (2) the experimenter observes the participants' random draw, and (3) a penalty is imposed on the participant if the self‐reported payoff and the random draw are not consistent. The results showed that while participants lied less in the targeted task given a higher level of monitoring, they significantly increased their lies in the untargeted task.





资源与环境经济学系林立国常任教授、博士研究生胡歆合作论文Do Scholar-Officials Regulate Better? Incentives, Enforcement, and Emissions in China在经济学国际二类期刊Journal of Regulatory Economics正式发表。


Do Scholar-Officials Regulate Better? Incentives, Enforcement, and Emissions in China

Journal of Regulatory Economics

Volume69,  September 2026


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This paper examines whether scholar-officials—local leaders with prior academic careers—improve environmental regulation in China. Using firm-level data, we find that jurisdictions led by scholar-officials reduce industrial emissions without harming economic growth. These leaders prioritize environmental protection, strengthen enforcement and penalties, and promote cleaner production. They also deter polluting firms while attracting cleaner ones, shifting industrial composition toward sustain-ability. Effects are stronger for private and foreign firms than for state-owned ones, suggesting ownership-specific compliance responses. The findings show that academic experience shapes regulatory behavior, enabling effective enforcement at limited eco-nomic cost.





政治经济学系王琳副教授、博士研究生任永豪合作论文《引导数字资本赋能我国数字生产力发展——基于技术革命生命周期视角》在国内权威B类期刊《教学与研究》正式发表。


引导数字资本赋能我国数字生产力发展——基于技术革命生命周期视角

《教学与研究》

2026年第 7 期


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本文基于技术革命生命周期理论以及中国特色社会主义制度特殊性,将数字生产力发展区分为形成阶段、增长阶段和延伸阶段三个时期,并分别探讨不同发展阶段数字资本的双重效应及具体作用机理。经过分析得出,在数字生产力形成阶段,数字资本的逐利逻辑有助于推动新兴数字技术研发与数字劳动资料创新,但其与金融资本的结合也容易引致经济“脱实向虚”倾向以及关键性创新受阻;在数字生产力增长阶段,数字资本的超级经济集聚效应能够加快新兴数字技术向现实生产力的转化速率,但其无序扩张趋势又容易加剧数字生产力分布的不平衡;在数字生产力延伸阶段,数字资本的强垄断性与强支配力会抑制数字要素所具有的社会化属性与生产力潜力,但在有效治理条件下,数字资本与公有资本的有机结合又有助于进一步拓展数字生产力发展空间。因此,应在明确当前我国数字生产力发展阶段基础上,通过积极引导和规范资本行为来筑牢数字生产力的形成基础,通过统筹数字资本的赋能效应与极化效应来优化数字生产力的增长格局,通过前瞻布局治理体系与制度框架来拓展数字生产力的发展空间,从而引导数字资本更好赋能我国数字生产力发展。





劳动经济学系陈媛媛教授、博士毕业生邹月晴合作论文《人工智能发展与女性生育意愿: 促进还是抑制?》在国内权威B类期刊《财经研究》正式发表。


人工智能发展与女性生育意愿: 

促进还是抑制?

《财经研究》

2026年第52卷第8期


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人工智能技术的迅猛发展对劳动力市场产生了深远影响,并可能进一步重塑个体生育意愿,对社会代际更替与可持续发展构成挑战。文章基于2014年、2018年和2022年中国家庭追踪调查(CFPS)数据,考察了人工智能发展对女性生育意愿的影响。研究发现,人工智能发展显著降低了女性的理想子女数。机制分析表明,人工智能发展会通过经济、家庭决策、家庭关系及文化观念等多重渠道影响女性生育意愿。在经济层面,人工智能通过促进女性就业并提高其相对收入,提高了生育的机会成本;在家庭决策层面,人工智能发展降低了男性配偶的生育意愿,并通过家庭内部协商机制传导至女性;在家庭关系层面,人工智能发展降低了女性与家庭成员的互动频率及婚姻满意度,使女性在生育上更为审慎;在文化观念层面,人工智能重塑了女性的生育与性别角色观念,进而推动生育观念由责任向个人选择转变。异质性分析发现,人工智能对高学历女性生育意愿和二孩及以上生育意愿的影响更大。进一步分析发现,配偶家务参与度的提升以及社会托育服务的完善,能够有效缓解人工智能对女性生育意愿的负面影响。文章为理解技术变革背景下生育率持续下降提供了微观证据,为在技术快速迭代背景下构建生育友好型社会提供了政策启示。





上海财经大学经济学院始终将科研创新能力的提升作为学科发展的关键驱动力。本院教师团队严格遵循一流学科的建设标准,在积极求索与持续创新的过程中,充分依托学院多年教育教学改革所积累的资源与经验,坚持扎根中国实际、融通国际视野的学术导向,不断深化对前沿问题的探索与研究,为学院学术竞争力与学科建设水平的全面提升贡献坚实力量。



供稿 | 蒋玉婷

编辑 | 杜雨晴

审核 | 燕红忠





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