【主题】Link Complementarity and Social Coordination
【报告人】崔志伟（副教授，中国人民大学经济学院）
【时间】2023年10月31日周二14:00-15:30
【地点】经济学院701室
【语言】中文
【摘要】We consider a model of social coordination and network formation where agents decide on an action in a coordination game and on whom to form costly links to. We explore the role of link complementarity; that is, active and passive connections are strategic complements, where for a given agent, active connections are links formed by herself, and passive connections are links that other agents form to her. With link complementarity, agents have to deal with both the issue of link coordination and the issue of action coordination. When agents are constrained in the number of links they form, Nash equilibria, including both action-homogenous and action-heterogenous strategy profiles, are characterized by reciprocal sub-networks where an agent forms links with agents who form a link with her. Depending on the precise parameters of the model, risk-dominant or payoff-dominant strategy profiles are stochastically stable. More interestingly, the resulting networks are strongly reciprocal: for almost every agent, the set of agents to whom she forms a link coincides with the set of agents who form a link with her. The notion of strong reciprocity substantially refines the set of reciprocal networks, and offers a prediction for interaction structures.
【报告人简介】崔志伟，中国人民大学经济学院副教授。主要研究领域及兴趣为网络博弈理论及应用、博弈学习理论及应用等。主持多项国家自然科学基金项目，研究成果发表于Journal of Economic Theory、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization、Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control、Journal of Mathematical Economics等国际经济学权威期刊，以及《管理评论》、《运筹与管理》等管理类CSSCI权威期刊。
