近期，上财经院经济学系的朱曙光助教授与Takuro Yamashita的合作论文“On the Foundations of Ex Post Incentive Compatible Mechanisms”已被美国经济杂志微观经济学、我校认定的经济学国际一类期刊American Economic Journal-Microeconomics接收。
论文摘要
This paper considers an interdependent-value robust mechanism design problem, where the principal has little knowledge about the agent's belief. Although ex post incentive compatible (EPIC) mechanisms can implement allocations without any knowledge about the agent's belief, we show that, under certain condition (order-reversing interdependence), there exists a non-EPIC mechanism that achieves a strictly higher expected revenue than any EPIC mechanism, given whatever the (admissible) belief structure the agent may enjoy. Conversely, with sufficiently small interdependence, such a non-EPIC mechanism does not exist: For some (admissible) belief structure, an EPIC mechanism achieves the highest expected revenue.
朱曙光助教授为我院2018年引进的“常任轨”（Tenure-track）教师，博士毕业于法国图卢兹经济学院，主要研究领域为微观经济理论中的机制设计、信息设计、群体决策理论，曾获上海财经大学第三届青年教师教学竞赛经济学学科组赛二等奖。
上海财经大学经济学院一直将科研创新能力视为学科核心竞争力的重要组成部分，学院教师科研团队以一流学科建设标准严格要求，积极探索、勇于创新，充分发挥学院持续推进的教育改革成果效益，坚定探索立足中国国情的国际化课题研究思路，持续推动前沿领域的问题研究，为学院的学科研究发展添砖加瓦。
（供稿、图：宋玥 编审：孙燕）
