【主题】On Competition in Linear Persuasion Games
【报告人】孙君泽（特聘副研究员，武汉大学经济与管理学院）
【时间】2023年11月7日周二14:00-15:30
【地点】经济学院701室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We study competition in persuasion with multiple senders in linear Bayesian persuasion games, where senders' payoffs depend only on the posterior expected (one-dimensional) state. Using the duality and extreme points methods for linear persuasion games, we derive a partial geometric characterization for the minimally informative equilibrium outcomes. Building on this, we identify a sufficient and necessary condition that ensures full information disclosure as the unique equilibrium outcome. We apply this condition to a game in which multiple senders compete in persuading a privately informed receiver to take a binary action. There, we show that a strong conflict of interests between senders is neither sufficient nor necessary to robustly–i.e., independently of the distributions of the state and the receiver's private type–induce full disclosure as the unique equilibrium outcome. We provide economically meaningful sufficient conditions for such robust full disclosure. Finally, we derive sufficient conditions that ensure the receiver to gain a higher payoff by exploiting senders' competition instead of consulting only a single sender.
【报告人简介】Junze Sun is an associate research fellow (untenured associate professor) at the School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University. He obtained his PhD in economics from the University of Amsterdam in 2019. His research interests lie in microeconomic theory, information economics, political economics, as well as behavioral and experimental economics. His current research mainly focuses on two themes: strategic provision and effects of information in elections, and strategic information transmission in sender-receiver games. His papers have been accepted for publication or requested for revision at various journals, including Games and Economics Behavior, Journal of Public Economic Theory, and the Economic Journal.
