【1180期】 12月4日微观经济学学术讲座：The Congested Assignment Problem (Hervé Moulin, Professor, Donald J. Robertson Chair in Economics, University of Glasgow)

【主题】The Congested Assignment Problem

【报告人】Hervé Moulin (Professor, Donald J. Robertson Chair in Economics, University of Glasgow)

【时间】2023年12月4日周一14:00-15:30

【地点】经济学院701室

【语言】英文

【摘要】We must assign n agents to m posts subject to negative congestion. If congestion is anonymous (each agent adds one unit) a canonical test of ex ante fairness guarantees to everyone one of their top n out of n × m feasible allocations. We call an assignment competitive if, taking the congestion at each post as given, everyone is assigned to one of their best posts. If it exists the competitive assignment is unique, efficient and ex ante fair. Randomising the assignment under cardinal vNM utilities ensures that every problem has a unique competitive congestion profile, implemented by a mixture of deterministic assignments rounding up or down the competitive congestion, and approximately ex ante fair, efficient and welfare equivalent. If congestion is weighted (agent-specific) ex ante fairness still guarantees an allocation in the top (1/m) quantile of feasible allocations, and under randomisation competitiveness is still an operational solution concept.

【报告人简介】Hervé Moulin教授于1975年毕业于巴黎大学，获得数学博士学位；1976 - 1984在法国E.N.S.A.E. Paris和Université Paris Dauphine工作；1984 – 2013分别在美国Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University、Duke University和Rice University工作；2013年至今作为Donald J. Robertson Chair in Economics在英国University of Glasgow工作。其主要研究涉及机制设计、社会选择、公平分配和博弈论等多个微观经济学领域。Hervé Moulin教授分别于1983、2015和2018年当选the fellow of the Econometric Society, the fellow of the Royal Society of Edinburgh和the fellow of the British Academy。Hervé Moulin教授目前担任国际微观经济学期刊Games and Economic Behavior主编。