【主题】Dynamic Resource Allocation in Tullock Tug-of-war
【报告人】郑捷（教授，山东大学经济研究院）
【时间】2023年11月21日周二14:00-15:30
【地点】经济学院701室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We examine a tug-of-war game between two players, employing the Tullock contest success function within the framework of dynamic resource allocation. Our aim is to establish a Markov perfect equilibrium of this game (if it exists) using pure strategies, and we show that there exist closed-form solutions for both players’strategies and winning probabilities. In each state, the optimal strategy for both players is to allocate the same proportion of their current endowment as their opponent, thereby maintaining a constant ratio of their endowments throughout the game. Furthermore, we discuss some extensions with a minimum score requirement and asymmetric score goal, respectively. In addition, We offer novel insights into the performance of the players in a dynamic contest with a budget constraint, in contrast to that under a cost structure.
【报告人简介】郑捷，山东大学特聘教授，山东大学经济研究院教授。研究领域包括信息经济学、实验经济学、行为经济学、产业经济学。研究工作发表于《经济研究》、American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings)、Games and Economic Behavior、Management Science、Nature Communications等国内外知名期刊。现任国际学术期刊Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization副主编、Research in Economics副主编、North American Journal of Economics and Finance编委，并担任Economic Modelling、Behavioral Sciences等多份SSCI/SCI期刊客座主编。
