【主题】Ex Post Strategy-proofness
【报告人】吴庆功（助理教授，香港科技大学）
【时间】2023年12月8日周五14:00-15:30
【地点】经济学院701室
【语言】英文
【摘要】For mechanism design settings with interdependent values, we study the problem of ex post strategy-proof implementation. The implementation criterion is that for every agent, truthful reporting is an optimal strategy regardless of (1) what strategies the other agents use, and (2) what types the other agents have. For settings with and without transfers, we characterize the implementable social choice functions and explore their implications. Specifically, when there are transfers, the implementable social choice functions are those that satisfy a generalized version of the cyclical monotonicity condition. Moreover, if the type space is one-dimensional, as in a standard auction environment, implementability is equivalent to a simple monotonicity condition, i.e., a“higher” type is assigned with a“higher” alternative. When there are no transfers, we find that nontrivial implementation is possible only when preferences are sufficiently independent. In binary and ternary voting settings, we show how this condition severely restricts the scope of ex post dominant strategy implementation.
【报告人简介】Qinggong Wu (PhD, University of Michigan, 2016) is currently an assistant professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. His research interests include mechanism design, social choice, matching, and communication, and his work has been published in Journal of Economic Theory, Theoretical Economics, etc.
