【主题】Preemptive Entry and Technology Diffusion: The Market for Drive-in Theaters
【报告人】孙世龙（博士后研究员，加拿大女王大学）
【时间】2023年12月19日周二10:00-11:30
【地点】经济学院701室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper studies the role and incidence of entry preemption strategic motives on the dynamics of new industries, while providing an empirical test for entry preemption, and quantifying its impact on market structure. The empirical context is the evolution of the U.S. drive-in theater market between 1945 and 1957. We exploit a robust prediction of dynamic entry games to test for preemption incentives: the deterrence effect of entering early is only relevant for firms in markets of intermediate size. Potential entrants in small and large markets face little uncertainty about the actual number of firms that will eventually enter. This leads to a non-monotonic relationship between market size and the probability of observing an early entrant. We find robust empirical support for this prediction using a large cross-section of markets. We then estimate the parameters of a dynamic entry game that matches the reduced-form prediction and quantify the strength of the preemption incentive. Our counterfactual analysis shows that strategic motives can increase the number of early entrants by as much as 50 percent in mid-size markets without affecting the number of firms in the long run. Strategic entry preemption leads on average to a 5% increase in entry costs and a 1% decrease in firms’ expected value (relative to an environment without strategic investments).
【报告人简介】孙世龙，加拿大女王大学史密斯商学院与经济系博士后研究员，先后于上海财经大学和威斯康星大学麦迪逊分校分别获得金融学学士和经济学博士学位。他的研究领域为实证产业组织和应用微观经济学，主要关注国际贸易、反垄断、市场准入等政策相关问题，并曾参与企业并购、反垄断诉讼案件中的经济学分析。
