【主 题】Informative Simplicity in Economics Design
【报告人】凤迪（博士后，美国西蒙斯劳弗数学科学研究所）
【时 间】2023年12月26日周二14:00-15:30
【地 点】经济学院401会议室
【语 言】英文
【摘要】This paper introduces informative simplicity to economics design, a concept that extends the idea of informational size (Mount and Reiter, 1974). This concept measures a mechanism's simplicity based on the minimum information for its operation. We apply this concept to both matching markets and auctions, yielding significant insights. This study aids in understanding and designing mechanisms by emphasizing the least amount of information needed for effective operation, thereby enhancing their credibility, auditability, and privacy protection. It offers a fresh perspective on evaluating mechanism complexity, steering economics design towards more transparent and efficient systems.
【报告人简介】Di Feng is a Postdoctoral Fellow at Simons Laufer Mathematical Sciences Institute (formerly known as the Mathematical Sciences Research Institute) in Berkeley. He also holds the position of a Junior Research Fellow at Research Institute for Economics and Business Administration, Kobe University. Prior to this, he earned his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Lausanne (HEC Lausanne). He uses tools from game theory, operations research, psychology, and computer science to study how different markets / mechanisms affect the incentives and motivations of participants and the corresponding economic outcomes.
