【主 题】Rooted in the Land: Clanship and Land Market in China
【报告人】刁文天（博士生，新加坡国立大学）
【时 间】2024年1月9日周二14:00-15:30
【地 点】经济学院801会议室
【语 言】中文
【摘 要】This paper examines the relationship between kin-based institutions and the state in the modern economy, exploring how clan captures the local government. Using data from China’s primary land market and a nationwide genealogy dataset, we employ spatial matching to estimate clan’s causal impacts on land parcel prices, which are a crucial source of fiscal revenue for local government. We find that firms linked to local clans obtained 1.3%-3.0% lower prices than those without clanship connections. We show that clan firms get lower prices through collusion with bidders, a process facilitated by local officials. This patron-client relationship leads to a decline in economic growth at the county level, while China’s anti-corruption campaign transforms the economic impact from negative to positive.
【报告人简介】刁文天，新加坡国立大学经济学博士候选人。主要从事经济史、政治经济学等方向研究。研究兴趣是非正式制度和文化的演化及其经济影响，研究对象包括宗族、军阀、晋商等。
