【主题】The Value of Anonymous Option
【报告人】李建培（教授，对外经济贸易大学）
【时间】2024年4月24日周三14:00-15:30
【地点】高等研究院楼232会议室
【语言】英文
【摘要】Personal data protection regulations typically require a seller to obtain consumers' explicit consent before processing their information. We model this requirement as an anonymous option, allowing consumers to maintain their anonymity when purchasing a product from a seller. We analyse a monopolist's incentive to offer such an option in a two-period model of repeated purchases and limited commitment. Although collecting consumer information implies full surplus extraction in the second period, the seller is better off by offering the anonymous option. This is because it enables the seller to commit to a high second-period price for unrecognized consumers and prevents the consumers from strategically delaying consumption in the first period. In contrast, consumers are worse off because of increased prices and reduced demand, and this result holds when consumers' intrinsic privacy concerns are private information. Consequently, privacy regulations mandating a compulsory anonymous option may fail to protect consumers' welfare.
【报告人简介】李建培，对外经济贸易大学经济学教授、博士生导师。主要从事产业组织和契约理论研究，研究题目包括团队生产中的锦标赛机制、最优采购契约的设计、专家市场契约设计、差别定价等。多篇论文发表于经济学国际顶尖期刊，包括RAND Journal of Economics(x3), Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Public Economics(x2)，International Economic Review, International Journal of Industrial Organization，Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Social Choice and Welfare等。先后主持国家社科基金、国家自科基金及霍英东教育基金会研究项目，曾入选教育部新世纪优秀人才计划，并荣获2018年中国信息经济学乌家培奖。担任国际学术期刊Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design副主编。
