【主题】Persuasion versus Presentation
【报告人】Carl Heese（助理教授，香港大学）
【时间】2024年4月30日周二14:00-15:30
【地点】经济学院401会议室
【语言】英文
【摘要】In many economic situations, people communicate strategically not only to influence the decision-making of their audience but also to shape the perception of certain unobserved characteristics of themselves (e.g. morality, loyalty, or capability). To study such situations, we propose a model of Bayesian persuasion in which a sender endowed with a private type designs the communication about a payoff-relevant state to a receiver. The sender, concerned with both the impacts on the receiver's action and how her type is perceived, aims to strike a balance between persuasion and self-presentation under optimal communication. Whether the receiver fares better or worse compared to the pure persuasion setting may depend on the selected equilibrium, and the welfare effects can be non-monotone with respect to the relative strength of the sender's different motives. We illustrate our findings within various classic payoff environments, for instance with quadratic losses or state-independent sender preferences. Finally, we use the model to shed new light on a wide range of applications.
【报告人简介】Dr. Heese is Assistant Professor of Economics at the University of Hong Kong, specializing in Political Economy and Microeconomic Theory. He has a Master’s degree in Mathematics from the University of Münster, awarded with distinction and valuable experience in investment banking and consulting in Europe. After that, he went on to earn his Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Bonn, achieving the highest distinction of summa cum laude. He has had the privilege of researching and teaching at prestigious institutions such as Yale and the London School of Economics, and prior to joining HKU, as an Assistant Professor at the University of Vienna.
