【主题】Certification Design in the Market for Lemons
【报告人】裴挺（助理教授，华中科技大学）
【时间】2024年5月14日周二14:45-16:00
【地点】经济学院401会议室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We study the optimal certification design in an environment in which a certifier charges a uniform fee to certify a seller with private types and type-dependent outside options. We find that the optimal certification depends not only on the willingness to pay (WTP) for each type but also on the true value of the seller's type. For a subset of types, the Top Cover Condition (TCC), i.e., the cumulative WTP of any top percentile types is always non-negative, is necessary for all types demanding the certification with some incentive compatible policy. When the outside options are non-decreasing, we show the sufficiency of TCC and the number of certificates required in the certification. We further provide an algorithm to find the optimal set of types to certify with a given fee. We find that the certifier will exclude types with low WTP. Moreover, with same WTP, those types with both high true value and outside options will be excluded prior to ones with low true value.
【报告人简介】裴挺，华中科技大学助理教授。本科就读于新加坡国立大学数学系，并于2021年取得新加坡国立大学经济博士学位。主要研究领域为博弈论、网络博弈和信息经济学。论文发表于Games and Economic Behavior, International Journal of Game Theory。
