【主题】Robust Contracts with Exploration
【报告人】刘畅（讲师，澳大利亚新南威尔士大学）
【时间】 2024年6月11日周二14:00-15:30
【地点】经济学院701会议室
【语言】英文
【主持人】杜宁华教授
【摘要】We study a two-period moral hazard problem; there are two agents, with action sets that are unknown to the principal. The principal contracts with each agent sequentially, and seeks to maximize the worst-case discounted sum of payoffs, where the worst case is over the possible action sets. The principal observes the action chosen by the first agent, and then offers a new contract to the second agent based on this knowledge, thus having the opportunity to explore in the first period. We introduce and compare three different notions of dynamic worst-case considerations. Within each notion, we define a suitable rule of updating and characterize the principal’s optimal payoff guarantee. We find that linear contracts are robustly optimal not only in static settings, but also in dynamic environments with exploration.
【报告人简介】刘畅，现任新南威尔士大学商学院经济学讲师。他先后获得清华大学经济与金融、数学与应用数学双学士学位（2017），哈佛大学经济学硕士（2020）和经济学博士学位（2023）。曾在美国国家数学科学研究所担任博士后研究员。他的主要研究领域为微观经济理论和产业组织理论。
