【1092期】 9月28日微观经济学学术研讨会: Sequential Bayesian Persuasion(吴文豪,助理教授,上海科技大学创业与管理学院)

时间:2021-09-22

【主题】Sequential Bayesian Persuasion

【报告人】吴文豪(助理教授,上海科技大学创业与管理学院)

【时间】2021928日 星期二 14:3016:00

【地点】经济学院701

【摘要】 I study a Bayesian persuasion model in which multiple senders sequentially persuade one receiver, after observing signal structures of prior senders and their realizations. I develop a geometric method, recursive concavification, to characterize the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium paths.  I show that if there are two senders who have constant-sum payoffs, the truth-telling signal structure is always supported in equilibrium. I prove the existence of the silent equilibrium, where at most one sender provides nontrivial information. I also provide a sufficient condition under which it is without loss of generality to focus on silent equilibria.


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