【主讲】Takeharu Sogo (副教授, 大阪大学经济学系)
【主题】Costly Entry and the Optimality of Asymmetric Auction Designs (Joint with Dan Bernhardt and Tingjun Liu)
【时间】2018年11月30日 (周五) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼701室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We investigate optimal auction mechanisms when bidders base costly entry decisions on their valuations, and payments depend on both the bids and asset payoffs generated by the winning bidder. We first show that when bidders pay with cash plus a large fixed royalty rate, the optimal mechanism can feature asymmetry, where the seller sets differential reserve prices so that bidders enter with strictly positive but different (ex-ante) probabilities, even when bidders are ex-ante identical. The optimality of asymmetric mechanisms extends to auctions with smaller royalty, including pure cash auctions, and the optimal degree of asymmetry rises with the royalty rate when there is sufficient valuation uncertainty relative to entry costs.
