【主讲】Xingye Wu (哥伦比亚大学 经济学博士)
【主题】Core of Convex Matching Games: A Scarf‘s Lemma Approach
【时间】2018年1月22日 (周一) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼701室
【语言】英文
【摘要】It is known that the core of a matching game is often empty when the market does not have a two-sided structure, when contracts are multilateral, or when agents have complementary preferences. In this paper, I use Scarf's lemma to show that given a convexity structure I introduce, the core of a matching game is always nonempty, even if the game has an arbitrary contracting network, multilateral contracts, and complementary preferences. I provide three applications to show how the convexity structureis satisfied in different contexts by different assumptions. In the first application, I show that in large economies, the convexity structure is satisfied if the set of participantsof each contract is small compared to the whole economy. Remarkably, no restriction on agents preferences is needed beyond continuity. The second application considersfinite economies, and I show that the convexity structure is satisfied if all agents have convex, but not necessarily substitutable preferences. The third application considersa large-firm, many-to-one matching market with peer preferences, and I show that the convexity structure is satisfied under convexity of preferences and a competitionaversion restriction on workers preferences over colleagues. Because of the convexity structure, all three applications have nonempty core.
