【主讲】徐晓书 (上海交通大学安泰经管学院副教授)
【主题】Grease or Sand: a Unified Explanation of Local Bureaucrats' Incentives in an Authoritarian System
【时间】2018年3月20日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼702室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper provides a novel micro foundation for the frequently observed slowing down problem in fast-growing economies under authoritarian systems. We establish a two-stage model to characterize the dynamic relationship between corruption and growth focusing on the formation and maintenance of political connections of local bureaucrats and firms. When local bureaucrats have concerns over local citizens' well-being (for the consideration of promotion) in addition to monetary payoffs, and when political connections have to be built and maintained through continuous illegal transfers, we produce three major findings. First, only highly competitive local firms can be protected under the threat of the entry of an outsider, which appears as patronage on the equilibrium path. Second, as long as the official does not fully represent the central government or local citizens, patronage always occurs with positive probability. Finally, with this two-stage model, there are cases where corruption increases social welfare, but this conclusion does not hold when more stages are added.
