【主讲】Seung-Gyu Sim (助教授，东京大学)
【主题】On-the-job Training and On-the-job Search: Wage-Training-Promotion in a Frictional Labor Market
【时间】2018年3月26日 (周一) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼402室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper analyzes the coexistence of on-the-job (general) training and on-the-job search in a frictional labor market where firms post wage-training-promotion contracts to preemptively back-load compensation. The back-loaded compensation discourages trained workers' efficient job-to-job transition, as if they jointly accumulated relationship-specific capital, which induces over-intensified training among more productive firms. The quantitative analysis predicts that the market equilibrium, relative to the efficiency benchmark, gets more skilled workers (training inefficiency) and less output (allocation inefficiency). Aggregate efficiency loss, being offset by future employer externality in the previous literature, is moderate. Interestingly, it can be even improved, as search friction is mitigated.Keywords: On-the-job Training, On-the-job Search, Wage-Training Contracts
