【主讲】包特 (Nanyang Technological University)
【主题】Agency Problem, CEO Incentives and Stock Price Dynamics: An Experimental Asset Market Approach
【时间】2016年12月12日 (周一) 10：30-12：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼701室
【语言】英文
【摘要】The optimal design of executive compensation has always been at the center of the research in corporate finance. We investigate experimentally how granting CEOs with stock ownership and the opportunity to trade influence CEOs‟ effort and market efficiency. We implement a 2x2 experimental design, where the treatments are differentiated based on: (1) whether the CEOs receive 20% of the profit as cash bonus or 20% of the stock shares as endowment, and (2) whether or not the CEOs are prohibited from participating in trading in the open market. The findings suggest that compared to cash bonus, stock ownership program does not induce higher effort, plausibly due to the presence of a salience effect or mental accounting. Granting CEOs the opportunities to trade leads to higher effort, but also less stock price stability. In all markets, the deviation of transaction prices from the underlying fundamental values is very small, which seems to support the market efficiency hypothesis, even in the presence of strategic uncertainty over the effort that governs the movement of the fundamental values.
