【主讲】胡贤华 (University of Amsterdam)
【主题】Selling Multiple Units: An Experimental Study
【时间】2016年12月21日 (周三) 13：30-15：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】Motivated by real-life examples, we analyze four auction mechanisms for selling m identical objects to n (>m) bidders with unit-demand: sequential first-price auction (SFPA), sequential second-price auction (SSPA), discriminatory auction (DA), and uniform auction (UA). Under bidder risk aversion, we show that the expected revenue from the SFPA (DA) is higher than that from the SSPA (UA), and find consistent results in a laboratory experiment. Furthermore, as predicted by our risk aversion model, we observe the “declining price anomaly” in sequential auctions. Lastly, though our theory predicts that the expected revenue from DA is higher than that from the SFPA, we observe the opposite results in the experiment and a behavioral model that incorporates heterogeneous belief can rationalize our data.
