【主讲】Prof. David K. Levine (Washington University in St. Louis)
【主题】Special Interests in Politics and Markets
【时间】2017年6月6日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼710室
【语言】英文
【摘要】Special interest groups are often large representing hundreds of thousands or millions of members. Yet they successfully overcome the free riding problem to be effective at lobbying. By contrast they are generally unsuccessful in overcoming the free riding problem to form cartels. This paper examines a model of self-organizing groups that use peer pressure over social networks to overcome public goods problems and asks under what circumstances these groups will be effective and in particular why lobbies but not cartels. (joint work with Andrea Mattozzi and Salvatore Modica)
【讲员简介】David K. Levine 为美国华盛顿大学（Washington University in St. Louis）经济系John H. Biggs 讲席教授，欧洲大学学院（European University Institute）罗伯特·舒曼高等研究中心（Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Study） 与经济系联合主任。他于1977 年获得加州大学洛杉矶分校数学学士学位，同年获得该校经济学硕士学位，1981 年获得麻省理工学院（MIT）经济学博士学位。其主要研究领域为宏观经济理论、微观经济理论、一般均衡理论、博弈论、实验经济学等。
