【主讲】Paul Grieco Associate Professor (Pennsylvania State University)
【主题】Strategic Patient Discharge: The Case of Long-Term Care Hospitals
【时间】2017年9月27日 (周三) 15：00-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼701室
【语言】英文
【摘要】Medicare’s prospective payment system for long-term acute-care hospitals (LTCHs) provides modest reimbursements at the beginning of a patient’s stay before jumping discontinuously to a large lump-sum payment after a pre-specified number of days. We show that LTCHs respond to financial incentives by disproportionately discharging patients after they cross the large-payment threshold, resulting in worse outcomes for patients. We find this occurs more often at for-profit facilities, facilities acquired by leading LTCH chains, and facilities co-located with other hospitals. Using a dynamic structural model, we evaluate counterfactual payment policies that would provide substantial savings for Medicare without adversely affecting patients.
