【主讲】曾华夏 副研究员 (中山大学)
【主题】Random Mechanism Design on Multidimensional Domains
【时间】2017年10月17日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼401室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We study random mechanism design in an environment where the set of alternatives has a Cartesian product structure. We first show that all generalized random dictatorships are strategy-proof on a minimally rich domain if and only if the domain is a top-separable domain. We next generalize the notion of connectedness (Monjardet, 2009) to establish a particular class of top-separable domains: connected+ domains, and show that in the class of minimally rich and connected+ domains, the multidimensional single-peakedness restriction is necessary and sufficient for the design of a flexible random social choice function that is unanimous and strategy-proof. Such a flexible function is distinct from generalized random dictatorships in the it allows for a systematic notion of compromise. Our characterization remains valid (under an additional hypothesis) for a problem of voting with constraints where not all alternatives are feasible (Barbera et al., 1997).
