【主讲】Jihong Lee Professor (Seoul National University)
【主题】Tax and Welfare in Dynamic Monopoly
【时间】2017年11月10日 (周五) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼701室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper considers the welfare effects of tax policy in a model of dynamic monopoly bargaining. By conditioning the tax rate on past trading volumes, the social planner can provide incentives for the seller to abandon sequential screening and clear the market immediately. The first-best tax policy is budget-neutral in (unique) equilibrium and derived independently of the discount factor. Moreover, efficient policy can be designed when the planner does not know the market distribution of individual demands, and to guarantee the seller’s participation in absence of rational expectations. We also explore the role of small, constant transaction tax.
