【主讲】Pradeep Dubey (Professor at Stony Brook University)
【主题】Insurance Contracts with Competitive Pooling
【时间】2017年11月21日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼701室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We build a model of competitive pooling and show how insurance contracts emerge in equilibrium, designed by the invisible hand of perfect competition. When pools are exclusive, we obtain a unique separating equilibrium. When pools are not exclusive but seniority is recognized, we obtain a continuum of different equilibria, where reliable and unreliable households take out a common primary insurance up to its maximum limit, and then unreliable households take out further secondary insurance. Typically, the primary-secondary equilibria are Pareto-superior to separating equilibria.
【讲员简介】Pradeep Dubey，计量经济学会会士（Fellow of The Econometric Society）， 纽约州立大学石溪分校经济系讲席教授。Dubey教授的研究领域包括博弈论和数理经济学。Dubey教授的工作曾发表在Econometrica，QJE，JET， MOR， GEB等期刊。
