【主讲】Shengjie Hong (清华大学)
【主题】Identification and Estimation of Multi-Period Simple Contracts
【时间】2017年12月14日 (周四) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼401室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper provides a rigorous econometric analysis of multi-period simple contract models where the principal offers a menu including both a cost-sharing contract and a cost-reimbursement contract for the agent to choose. We establish that the model primitives including agents’ cost and disutility functions, distribution of innate costs (type), and parameters characterizing agents’ bargaining power and the intertemporal preference are all nonparametrically identified if the agent exerts effort. Using the data on transport procurement contracts in France, we find strong evidence that the monotonicity of optimal effort exerted by the agent, which can be implied by convex cost functions, plays a crucial role in the performance of multiperiod simple contracts by comparison with the constant optimal effort, which is implied by linear cost functions.
