【主讲】Shigehiro Serizawa (Osaka University)
【主题】Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object assignment problems with multi demand preferences
【时间】2015年11月24日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼501室
【语言】英文
【摘要】Consider the problem of allocating objects to agents and how much they should pay.Each agent has a preference relation over pairs of a set of objects and a payment. Prefer-ences are not necessarily quasi-linear. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe environmentswhere payments influence agents' abilities to utilize objects. This paper is to investigatethe possibility of designing efficient and strategy-proof rules in such environments. Apreference relation is single demand if an agent wishes to receive at most one object; it ismulti demand if whenever an agent receives one object, an additional object makes himbetter off. We show that if a domain contains all the single demand preferences and atleast one multi demand preference relation, and there are more agents than objects, thenno rule satises efficiency, strategy-proofness, individual rationality, and no subsidy forlosers on the domain.
