【主讲】Takashi Ui (一桥大学)
【主题】Optimal Disclosure of Public Information with Endogenous Acquisition of Private Information
【时间】2015年12月4日 (周五) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼710室
【语言】英文
【摘要】A public authority provides agents with public information, but each agent also acquires his own private information, and they play a linear quadratic Gaussian game. More provision of public informationinduces less acquisition of private information, yet this effect attenuates as the elasticity of marginal cost of information acquisition increases. The main result of this paper characterizes the optimal disclosure of public information in terms of an arbitrary quadratic welfare function, where the elasticity of marginal costplays an essential role. To this end, we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for welfare to increase with public information. We find that the welfare effect of public information is determined by a linear combination of the two extreme cases with zero and infinite elasticities of marginal cost.
