【主讲】Chiu Yu Ko (National University of Singapore)
【主题】Dictate a Dictator, Succeed a Successor
【时间】2015年12月8日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper considers a simple model to explain why the direct succession mechanismfails and the indirect counterpart succeeds in making smooth leadershiptransitions in the Chinese Communist Party. Under direct succession where thesuccessor is dictated by the incumbent leader, the successor with unconstrainedpower will deviate from the policy set by predecessors for a greater political surplus,leading to unstable political outcomes. In contrast, under indirect successionwhere the successor is dictated by the former leader, a patient successor prefers thecontinuation of the existing policy since the former leader can punish the successorvia intensifying the ensuing political competition should the successor deviate.
