【主讲】郝丽 (University of Arkansas)
【主题】Understanding Diffusion of Responsibility in Anti-social Behaviors
【时间】2015年12月24日 (周四) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼602室
【语言】英文
【摘要】We study how the presence of a second sender affects the tendency of sending anti-social offers to the receiver, in a modified sender-receiver game where messages are delivered in person (2-player vs. 3-player games). There are two opposing effects: looking good and generous in front of a peer promotes pro-social behavior, while the diffusion of responsibility effect increases anti-social behavior. We find that the diffusion of responsibility is the dominating factor, as anti-social behavior is significantly higher when a second sender is present in both contexts: the unethical message is deceptive (Hoodwink treatment), or is honest but unfavorable to the receiver (Bitter Pill treatment). Furthermore, we elicited both senders’ reservation prices for sending the anti-social message independently via strategy method, so our result identifies that the diffusion of responsibility effect can be driven from the presence of the second sender alone, and not necessarily through market interactions (i.e. free-form negotiations, double auctions) between senders. Finally, senders’ own normative beliefs on the acceptability of the anti-social offers are predictive of the difference in their anti-social decisions between 2-player and 3-player games; senders’ second-order beliefs on receiver’s own prediction of receiving anti-social offers is highly significant in explaining individual differences in their adoption of anti-social behavior.
