【主讲】Qinggong Wu (University of Michigan)
【主题】Coarse Communication and Institution Design
【时间】2016年1月19日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】Many institutions aggregate information for a common objective via coarsecommunication. Coarseness gives rise to interesting institution designproblems which would otherwise be trivial. The paper first elaborates onthis point with an analysis of the optimal binary voting systems for theCondorcet Jury Problem, then proposes a unified framework for modeling a general class of information-aggregating institutions. Within thisclass, it is shown that institution A outperforms institution B for anycommon objective if and only if the underlying communication infrastructure of A can be obtained from that of B by a sequence of elementaryoperations. Each operation either removes redundant communication instruments from B or introduces effective ones to it. The general analysisis applied to two specific problems. In the first application, it is shownthat an optimal generalized voting system has a sequential procedure anda dictatorship-like rule. In the second application, it is shown that dataoverload can be avoided for an organization with limited data-processingCapacity.
