673期 4月5日 :Social Learning and Delay in a Dynamic Model of Price Competition(Masaki Aoyagi, Osaka University)

发布者:系统管理员发布时间:2016-04-05浏览次数:151

【主讲】Masaki Aoyagi (Osaka University)

【主题】Social Learning and Delay in a Dynamic Model of Price Competition

【时间】2016年4月5日 (周二) 15:30-17:00

【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室

【语言】英文

【摘要】This paper studies dynamic price competition between two firms selling differentiateddurable goods to two buyers whose valuations of the two goods depend ontheir own private type as well as that of the other buyer. We derive a key intertemporalproperty of the equilibrium prices and construct an equilibrium based on thisproperty. We show that social learning reduces the equilibrium prices in the sensethat when the buyers are more interdependent and hence have a stronger incentiveto wait and see, the firms respond by lowering their period 1 prices. Interestingly,we find that this response by the firms along with the intertemporal property ofthe equilibrium prices implies that buyers delay their decisions less often when theybecome more interdependent.

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