【主讲】Chia-Ling Hsu (Kyushu University)
【主题】Two-Sided Matching with Appointment Schedule
【时间】2016年4月19日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper studies a two-sided many-to-many matching problem, where agents on the opposite sides need to schedule for appointments. A unique feature in this model is that if an agent uses a time slot for an appointment with another agent on the other side, that time slot cannot be used for meeting any other agents. An example is the interview schedule between junior economists and potential employers in the ASSA meeting. I show the existence of a stable matching. Moreover, I show that the number of agents on the opposite side that an agent is matched with may be different in different stable matchings. Surprisingly, when this problem is formulated with the matching with contracts framework, the choice functions may not be bilaterally substitutable or weakly substitutable, which are the weakest sufficient condition and necessary condition (in the sense of maximal domain) known in the literature, respectively.
