【主讲】黄葵 (新加坡国立大学)
【主题】On the Number and Size of Banks: Efficiency and Equilibrium
【时间】2016年9月19日 (周一) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼701室
【语言】英文
【摘要】I develop a model where banking arises endogenously from economies of scale in monitoring. Only a fraction of agents are designated bankers, to reduce monitoring costs, but that implies more deposits per bank and therefore greater incentives to divert profits opportunistically. Hence, with fewer bankers, they need higher rewards. The optimal number of banks decreases with monitoring costs, impatience and the temptation to default, and increases with investment returns. To implement efficient allocations, there is a tension between equilibrium with free entry and having positive bankprofits for incentive reasons. Therefore, equilibrium is optimal only if we limit entry by taxation or a quota on bank charters.
