【主讲】Prof. Yi-Chun Chen (NUS)
【主题】Getting implementation to work
【时间】2016年9月20日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】This paper provides a two-stage mechanism which fully implements any social choice function under initial rationalizability in complete information environments. Accommodating any belief revision assumption, initial rationalizability is the weakest among all the rationalizability concepts in extensive form games. This mechanism is also robust to small amounts of incomplete information about the state of nature. That is, the mechanism not only fully implements any social choice function in complete information environments but also does so in all nearby environments where players' values are private. Although our mechanism allows for monetary transfers out of the solution path, we can make them arbitrarily small and even achieve its budget balance when there are more than two players.
