【主讲】Yangguang Huang (香港科技大学)
【主题】Detecting Quality Manipulation Corruption in Scoring Auctions
【时间】2016年12月6日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼701室
【语言】英文
【摘要】Scoring auctions are particularly susceptible for corruption because quality assessment requires special expertise, which necessitates the participation of a skilled intermediary agent to evaluate quality. Corruption via quality manipulation arises when the agent is bribed to exaggerate the quality score of a seller. We proposes a structural estimation method of scoring auctions and three tests for detecting quality manipulation. We apply them to a data set of server room construction project procurement.We provide empirical evidence for three key model implications of the theoretical model of scoring auctions and estimate the effect of increasing quality weight. We find some signs of corruption in sub-samples with high quality weight scoring rules and large engineer's estimated costs, but the data set in general passes the corruption detection tests.
