【主讲】Ted Bergstrom (University of California at Santa Barbara)
【主题】Tales of Competing Altruists
【时间】2014年9月16日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】Abstract: In a population of N people, a problem arises. Any one of these people could solve the problem by taking a costly action. Any of them would solve the problem if they knew nobody else would do it. Each must take action without knowing what the others have done. In this environment, in symmetric Nash equilibrium, the probability that action is taken decreases as the population increases. This problematic situation is known as the Volunteers' Dilemma. This paper considers the following questions. How general is the Volunteers' Dilemma Effect? When can we expect altruistic actions to be less frequent in larger populations than in smaller populations. We present a mixture of theoretical results, results of field experiments, and results of laboratory experiments that bear on this question.
