【主讲】John K.-H. Quah (Oxford University)
【主题】Strategic Complementarity: A Revealed Preference Analysis
【时间】2014年10月21日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】In this paper we consider an observer who has access to a data set drawn from the outcomes of a family of games. Each observation consists of players’ chosen actions, the strategy sets from which actions are chosen, and the parameters which may affect payoffs. Variation in the data arises from changes to parameters and/or changes to the strategy sets. We show that an intuitive and easy-to-check property on the data set we call the strong axiom of revealed complementarity (SARC) is necessary and sufficient for it to be consistent with the hypothesis that the observations are pure strategy Nash equilibria from a family of games with strategic complementarity. We also explicitly construct a set of preferences, one for each player that agrees with the data and is consistent with strategic complementarity (in the sense that each agent’s preference obeys the single crossing differences property). Lastly, we explain how we can identify the set of possible Nash equilibria in a game outside the set of observations. We show that the set of possible Nash equilibria is very well-behaved; for example, it effectively has a largest and a smallest element and these can be calculated with some version of a best-response dynamic.
