【主讲】Yasutora WATANABE (香港科技大学)
【主题】Entry by Merger: Estimates from a Two-Sided Matching Model with Externalities
【时间】2014年12月11日 (周四) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼602室
【语言】英文
【摘要】As firms often acquire incumbents to enter a new market, presence of desirable acquisition targets affect both merger and entry decisions simultaneously. We study these decisions jointly by considering a two-sided matching model with externalities to account for the "with whom" decision of merger and to incorporate negative externalities of post-entry competition. By estimating this model using data on commercial banks, we investigate the effect of the state-level entry deregulation. After proposing a deferred acceptance algorithm applicable to the environment with externalities, we exploit the lattice structure of stable allocations to construct moment inequalities that partially identify the banks' payoff function including potential (dis)synergies. We find greater synergies between larger and healthier potential entrants and smaller and less-healthy incumbent banks. Compared with de novo entry, entry barriers are much lower for entry by merger. By prohibiting de novo entry, our counterfactual quantifies the effect of the deregulation.
