【主讲】Nick Feltovich (Monash University)
【主题】The Effect of Leniency Programmes on Anti–competitive Behaviour: an Experimental Study
【时间】2014年12月16日 (周二) 15：30-17：00
【地点】上海财经大学经济学院楼801室
【语言】英文
【摘要】Leniency programmes, under which firms engaging in anti–competitive activities can report their behaviour to a competition authority in return for reduced punishment, are a growing facet of competition policy in many countries. We construct and analyse a simple model of duopoly pricing and competition policy that captures the two important effects of leniency programmes: the direct effect, a reduction in the stability of collusive arrangements, and the counterproductive indirect effect, an increase in the incentives to form collusive arrangements in the first place by lowering the cost of exiting them. As these point in opposite directions, the net theoretical effect is indeterminate. We then conduct a laboratory experiment with human subjects playing the role of firms. We compare two leniency programmes – full immunity from fines and partial immunity – against a baseline with no leniency programme in place. We find that both leniency programmes yield the direct effect (cartels are more likely to break down) but not the indirect effect (they are not more likely to form initially), and thus either programme reduces the extent of collusion and supra–competitive prices and profits overall.
